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WHEN DISCIPLINES COLLIDE: POLYGAMY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES ON TRIAL
Jodi Lazare*
This article draws on the Supreme Court of British Columbia’s Reference re: Section 293
of the Criminal Code of Canada [the Polygamy Reference] as a concrete example of the
benefits and limitations of intense judicial reliance on social science evidence in the
adjudication of constitutional rights and freedoms at the trial level. By examining the
evidence tendered, I suggest that the current adversarial model of adjudication is
illsuited to combining the legal and the social scientific endeavours. The divergent
values, methodologies and objectives of the legal and scientific enterprises severely limit
the benefits that the former can yield, thus compromising the effectiveness and utility of
the courts for social groups whose claims are heavily grounded in non-legal evidence.
Further, I argue that the vast amounts of contradictory evidence typically tendered in
rights challenges, as well as the complex and controversial nature of Charter questions
and the inevitable need for judges to adjudicate values, risk resulting in undue deference
to the legislator, hinder the delivery of justice and ultimately undermine the raison-d’être
of Charter litigation.
Cet article concerne le renvoi porté devant la Cour suprême de la Colombie-Britannique
au sujet de l’article 293 du Code criminel [Polygamy Reference – renvoi sur la
polygamie], qui constitue un exemple concret des avantages et inconvénients de
l’utilisation intensive des éléments de preuve relevant des sciences sociales dans la
détermination des droits et libertés constitutionnels en première instance. En examinant
les éléments de preuve présentés, j’affirme dans cet article que le modèle actuel de
règlement des litiges, qui repose sur l’approche accusatoire, se prête mal à la
combinaison des démarches juridiques et de celles qui relèvent des sciences sociales. Les
valeurs, méthodologies et objectifs divergents des démarches juridiques et scientifiques
restreignent les avantages inhérents aux méthodes juridiques, ce qui compromet
l’efficacité et l’utilité des tribunaux pour les groupes sociaux dont les revendications
reposent en grande partie sur des éléments de preuve de nature non juridique. Je
soutiens également que la multitude d’éléments de preuve contradictoires habituellement
présentés dans les litiges mettant en cause des droits, conjuguée à la nature complexe et
controversée des questions concernant la Charte et à la nécessité inévitable pour les
juges de soupeser des valeurs, risque de se traduire par une trop grande déférence
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envers le législateur, de nuire à l’administration de la justice et, en bout de ligne, de
saper la raison d’être des litiges fondés sur la Charte.
I. INTRODUCTION
Law is not a standalone discipline. On its own, legal reasoning rarely produces appropriate solutions to
the complex social questions it is used to decide. Rather, courts and judges must look beyond the law in
order to properly determine the content of individual rights and freedoms, especially when evaluating
the effects of the law on particular groups. When adjudicating social policy in the context of a
constitutional challenge, the social context is gleaned from non-legal sources, often in the form of
evidence from the social sciences, that is, the work of those who study human behaviour. This article
examines a concrete example of judicial reliance on this type of non-legal, or empirical, evidence by a
trial court and identifies some of the many difficulties accompanying the practice — difficulties that
may impact the fair resolution of rights disputes and challenges by socially marginalized litigants, whose
cases will often be grounded in the social sciences, thus limiting the effectiveness and utility of rights
litigation. The goal of this article is two-fold: to illustrate the virtues of using social science evidence in
constitutional adjudication at the trial level and to draw out some of the obstacles that impede the law’s
ability to maximize the valuable contributions that the social sciences have on offer. It thus contributes
to the lively discussion on the appropriate use of the social sciences in the courtroom and the vital
importance of considering social context in accessing justice.
This article approaches these issues by examining a Canadian trial decision that typified the social
sciences approach to judicial decision-making. In the Polygamy Reference, the British Columbia
Supreme Court considered “several hundred” legal and social science materials in an advisory opinion
upholding the criminal prohibition of polygamous marriage in Canada.1 The decision is thus a striking
example of the formation of an evidentiary record based on social facts. Moreover, in coming to his
decision, Chief Justice Bauman struggled with characteristic difficulties encountered by trial judges
evaluating the evidence of social scientists.
Determining the substantive content of Charter rights requires a factually-grounded analysis of the
harms targeted by an impugned provision as well as its effects. Current constitutional adjudication
presses judges to evaluate empirical evidence at the level of determining the content of rights and in the
balancing of distinct rights required by section 1 of the Charter.2 For decades, the Supreme Court of
Canada has looked to social science evidence when assessing claims of unconstitutionality.3 This article,
however, is premised on the belief that appellate decisions do not provide the ideal sample for exploring
the judicial treatment of empirical evidence. Rather, the primary function of the reasons of reviewing
courts is to offer guidance to trial judges, who confront the evidence head on and assess its ultimate
1
2

3

Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588 at para 32, [2011] BCJ no 2211 [Polygamy
Reference].
See Sujit Choudhry, “So What is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality Analysis under the
Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 34:2 Sup Ct L Rev 501; Danielle Pinard, “Le droit et le fait dans l’application des
standards et la clause limitative de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés” (1989) 30:1 C de D 137.
See e.g. Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927, 58 DLR (4th) 577 [Irwin Toy]; RJR-MacDonald
Inc v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 SCR 199, 127 DLR (4th) 1 [RJR-MacDonald].
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value. The trial, then, aimed primarily at finding facts, is the best place to observe the interaction
between the law and the social sciences. The evidentiary record created at trial informs not only the trial
judge’s decision, but also, with rare exceptions, the factual basis for appellate review. Evidence
tendered, including that of social scientists, thus has its greatest impact at the first instance. In
attempting to understand facts — the very things that social science evidence is meant to illuminate —
the appellate court is the wrong place to look.4
The significance of first instance courts provides the basis for the object of the present study, as does
the vast amount of social science evidence and literature relied on therein. The Polygamy Reference
provides a recent and practical example of the usefulness of the social sciences to the law and assists in
responding to some common criticisms of judicial reliance on non-legal evidence. Further, the decision
also demonstrates some of the typical limitations of non-legal evidence in the courtroom and, in some
cases, the resulting hindrances to the just resolution of constitutional disputes about social issues. For
example, as I develop below, the Polygamy Reference illustrates the diverging concepts of truth, as
understood by social scientists and by litigators, and the limits of scientific research prepared
exclusively for litigation. It also provides a compelling example of the idea that our system of partybased adjudication is not the best way of resolving the polycentric issues which typically characterize
Charter challenges.
The Polygamy Reference evaluated the constitutionality of the criminal prohibition of polygamous
marriage in Canada.5 Chief Justice Bauman endeavoured to determine whether the impugned provision
violates the Charter guarantees of religious freedom, freedom of expression and association, freedom
from discrimination and the protection of life, liberty and security of the person.6 The volume of
evidence was tremendous, consisting of more than 90 affidavits, 22 of which were presented by experts
in a wide range of social science disciplines, as well as several hundred articles, books and DVDs.7
According to a 20-page appendix to the decision listing all of the materials submitted, the Chief Justice
dealt with almost 300 non-legal documents. The discussion of the evidence, excluding its application to
the relevant constitutional principles, spans 718 paragraphs of the total 1,367 paragraphs of the decision.
Although he determined that criminalization violates the religious freedom of fundamentalist Mormons
as well as the security of the person of members of the religious community aged under 18, Chief Justice
Bauman concluded that, save for its effect on children, the prohibition, based primarily on its goal of
preventing the proven harms of polygamous marriage, is constitutionally justified.
Part II of this article draws on the Polygamy Reference to illustrate some of the virtues of judicial
reliance on social science evidence in adjudicating controversial social questions and attempts to
respond to some of the common criticisms of the practice. Part III then highlights some of the ways in
which the law and the social sciences make poor companions in the courtroom. Based on an in-depth
review of the Polygamy Reference’s use of non-legal evidence, I suggest that the divergent values and
4

5
6
7

Jerome Frank, “A Plea for Lawyer-Schools” (1947) 56:8 Yale LJ 1303 at 1311. See also Canada (Attorney General) v
Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 SCR 1101 (on the fundamental role of the trial judge in evaluating evidence of social
and legislative facts).
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 293.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss 2(a), 2(b), 2(d), 15, 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
Polygamy Reference, supra note 1 at paras 28, 29, 32.
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objectives of the law and the social sciences limit the benefits that the latter can yield in the delineation
of constitutional freedoms. In Part IV, I argue that the vast amount of conflicting and contradictory
evidence tendered in the case illustrates how the current model of adversarial proceedings is ill-equipped
to deal with the multifaceted nature of Charter litigation and the volume of issues that rights litigation
generally raises. Finally, I attempt to show that the value judgments inherent in adjudicating social
policy risk resulting in undue deference to the legislature.
The Polygamy Reference has already attracted scholarly commentary, with interests ranging from the
decision’s cultural implications,8 to the racialization of marital forms9 and the regulation of polygamy
from a feminist constitutional approach.10 Other commentators have examined the appropriateness of a
trial-level reference as opposed to the typical appellate reference,11 in which a provincial legislature asks
the province’s court of appeal for its opinion on a legal matter, usually proposed or contentious
legislation.12 While the latter issue is relevant to the present discussion — the fact that the case was a
reference justified Chief Justice Bauman’s “liberal approach to admissibility”13 — the focus of this
paper is on the general difficulties inherent in using social science evidence when adjudicating legal
questions of sensitive social policy, with the Polygamy Reference as a fitting example.
This paper therefore has implications beyond the constitutional reference, or challenge. In family law,
for example, social science evidence is often useful in determining questions of custody and support.14
In indigenous matters, parties often rely on the evidence of historians in forming the historical and
geographical bases for their claims.15 Likewise, the fate of linguistic rights litigation will often depend
on the historical record, as established by social scientists.16 The pursuit of justice often rests on the
ability of legal actors to deal with complex facts and non-legal evidence. Thus, my reading of the
Polygamy Reference and my conclusion that the law has a long way to go before it can make proper use
of the social sciences is applicable beyond the context of the particular case.
II. SOCIAL SCIENCES AND LAW: CONTRIBUTIONS AND CRITICISMS
Socio-legal theorists maintain that one of the contributions of the social sciences and sociology in
particular to the study of criminal law is a unique ability to situate phenomena in their social, cultural
8
9
10
11
12

13
14
15
16

See e.g. Carissima Mathen, “Reflecting Culture: Polygamy and the Charter” (2012) 57 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 357.
See e.g. Joanna Sweet, “Equality, Democracy, Monogamy: Discourses of Canadian Nation Building in the 2010-2011
British Columbia Polygamy Reference” (2013) 28:1 CJLS 1.
See e.g. Beverley Baines, “Polygamy and Feminist Constitutionalism” in Beverley Baines, Daphne Barak-Erez & Tsvi
Kahana, eds, Feminist Constitutionalism: Global Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 452.
See e.g. Michael Da Silva, “Trial Level References: In Defence of a New Presumption” (2012) 2:2 UWO Journal of
Legal Studies 4.
“The Lieutenant Governor in Council may refer any matter to the Court of Appeal or to the Supreme Court for hearing
and consideration, and the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court must then hear and consider it.” Constitutional
Question Act, RSBC 1996, c 68, s 1. Accord Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, s 53.
Polygamy Reference, supra note 1 at para 46.
See e.g. Willick v Willick, [1994] 3 SCR 670, 119 DLR (4th) 405.
See e.g. Arthur J Ray, “Ethnohistorical geography and aboriginal rights litigation in Canada: Memoir of an expert
witness” (2012) 55:4 The Canadian Geographer 397.
See e.g. Mark C Power, François Larocque & Darius Bossé, “Constitutional Litigation, the Adversarial System and some
of its Adverse Effects” (2012) 17:2 Rev Const Stud 1.
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and historical context.17 In the Polygamy Reference, evidence was presented by historians, sociologists,
anthropologists, evolutionary psychologists, economists, family demographers and religious scholars in
an effort to establish the historical context of the practice of polygamy both globally and in Canada.18
Justifying his generous approach to admissibility, Chief Justice Bauman remarked on the potential
impact of Charter cases and the consequent judicial expectation of and insistence on “the careful
preparation of and presentation of a factual basis.”19 Accordingly, “[t]he relevant facts put forward
[covered] a wide spectrum dealing with scientific, social, economic and political aspects.”20 Thus, the
case evinces the arguments of proponents of the social sciences approach to law, who maintain that
constitutional reasoning which does not examine the social reality of the law lacks both
comprehensiveness and transparency.21
In addition to context, the social sciences are useful in terms of their methods and methodology.
Social scientists carry out significant amounts of empirical research with sociologists in particular
gathering vast amounts of data aimed at discovering “what is actually going on in the world.”22 This
empirical research was invaluable to Chief Justice Bauman’s analysis, without which, any substantial
inquiry into the observable effects of the impugned provision would have been illusory. Some of that
evidence consisted of statistical analysis and raw data regarding, for example, the incidence of teen
births in fundamentalist Mormon communities.23 Moreover, sociologists have a proclivity for studying
socially marginalized groups, or sub-cultures, which other disciplines tend to avoid.24 This aspect of the
social sciences proved essential to the analysis; while the record was vast by the standards of court
proceedings, the fact that it embodied “the bulk of contemporary academic research into polygamy”25
indicates the limited scholarly attention polygamy has attracted. The constitutional analysis would have
been severely lacking were it not for the sociological penchant for examining subjects outside of the
mainstream.
The Polygamy Reference illustrates another way in which differences between the sociological
perspective and those of other disciplines are useful to courts. Where many disciplines, such as
economics and psychology, are more individualistic, sociology begins with the premise that individuals
are socially-determined, thus making it the ideal framework from which to examine the global effects or
effectiveness of a law.26 The sociological inquiry into how individuals interact with their environment
enabled Chief Justice Bauman to inquire not only into the situations of individual men and women, but
to conduct a more global evaluation of the vulnerabilities of members of polygamous communities, as
the focus of the Polygamy Reference was not limited to the effects of polygamy on individuals. Nor was
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Calvin Morrill et al, “Seeing Crime and Punishment Through a Sociological Lens: Contributions, Practices, and the
Future” (2005) U Chicago Legal F 289 at 295.
Polygamy Reference, supra note 1 at paras 146-233, 234-336, 337-467.
Ibid at para 51, citing Mackay v Manitoba, [1989] 2 SCR 357 at 361-362, 61 DLR (4th) 385.
Ibid.
Tracey L Meares & Bernard E Harcourt, “Forward: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure” (2000) 90:3 J Crim L & Criminology 733 at 739.
Morrill et al, supra note 17 at 302.
Polygamy Reference, supra note 1 at paras 710-725.
Morrill et al, supra note 17 at 303.
Polygamy Reference, supra note 1 at para 27.
Morrill et al, supra note 17 at 315.
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the analysis limited to its effects (and those of the prohibition) on fundamentalist Mormons as a group,
or on portions of the group, such as teenaged girls or young men. Rather, a significant portion of the
reasons dealt with the potential effects of legal polygamy on Canadian society at large.27 This evidencebased analysis suggests that constitutional decision-making about social realities will necessarily be
more compelling where it relies on established social facts arrived at through scientific research.28
Naturally, the social sciences approach to the law is not without its detractors. Critics claim that
judicial reliance on empirical research is a mask behind which judges can assert political ideologies and
agendas.29 Instead of informing judicial decisions, reliance on the social sciences serves a legitimizing
function for deciding cases in a particular way and the use of social science evidence is regarded as a
justification for judicial statements of personal beliefs and preferences.30 While proponents of the sociolegal approach admit that courts have a tendency to employ rhetorical statements to confer a sense of
authority on their decisions, they maintain that actual reliance on social science data — where decisionmakers properly examine the empirical evidence — in fact makes for more transparent decision-making.
It forces judges to be honest regarding the inescapable value judgments that they must make, thus
rendering them more accountable.31 Instead of employing normative constitutional theory, which
purports to guide and reform social action, decision-makers should look at the empirical evidence and
base their legal decisions on what they see;32 social realties should guide the decision-making process
and not the reverse. Where traditional constitutional theory attempts to offer a “data-free method of
deciding cases,” what is needed is a constitutional law which actually employs the relevant social
facts.33
Chief Justice Bauman’s exhaustive analysis demonstrates this understanding of the evidentiary needs
of litigating social issues. In order to reach an appropriate result, it was necessary to undertake an indepth examination of the actual effects of polygamous marriage, both on individuals and the collective.
A traditional argument by analogy or distinction would simply not have been an adequate means of
reaching a suitable result. Presumably, like most lawyers and judges, Chief Justice Bauman did not have
extensive or advanced training in the social sciences. Thus, in relying on the social science data, he
acknowledged his shortcomings and the practical impossibility of arriving at a sensible result by
employing constitutional reasoning alone. As he acknowledged, “[d]etermining the actual salutary and
deleterious effects of an infringement of a Charter right … calls for more than a hypothetical or

27
28

29
30

31
32
33

See e.g. Polygamy Reference, supra note 1 at paras 13, 14.
Peter W Sperlich, “Social Science Evidence and the Courts: Reading Beyond the Adversary Process” (1980) 63:4
Judicature 280 at 289. See also Christian Atias, Épistémologie juridique, 1st ed (Paris: Dalloz, 2002) (on the utility of
non-legal disciplines in determining legal rules at 106).
Meares & Harcourt, supra note 21 at 739, citing Dean M Hashimoto, “Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law”
(1997) 76:1 Or L Rev 111.
Richard Lempert, “‘Between Cup and Lip’: Social Science Influences on Law and Policy” (1988) 10:2, 3 Law & Pol’y
167 at 188-190. See also Niels Petersen, “Avoiding the Common-Wisdom Fallacy: The Role of Social Sciences in
Constitutional Adjudication” (2013) 11:2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 294 at 295.
Meares & Harcourt, supra note 21 at 739.
Richard A Posner, “Against Constitutional Theory” (1998) 73:1 NYL Rev 1 at 3.
Ibid at 18.
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theoretical analysis.”34 Thus, the Polygamy Reference exemplifies the weight which non-legal data can
and often should carry in constitutional decision-making.
III. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND LAW: A DISCIPLINARY CLASH
The Polygamy Reference also exposes some of the many problems inherent in judicial reliance on
expert testimony about human behaviour. This Part draws on the trial judge’s reasons to advance the
argument that a strong theoretical disconnect between the two disciplines limits the law’s ability to
obtain the answers it seeks in determining the scope of constitutional freedoms. In particular, the current
adversarial model for interpreting constitutional rights fails to bridge this disciplinary divide.
A. Truth versus Persuasion
The Polygamy Reference illustrates that the challenges judges face when adjudicating social
questions under the Charter are often due, in large part, to the conflicting or inconclusive nature of
social science evidence and the “empirical uncertainty” surrounding the infringement of individual
rights.35 The evidence tendered in the case suggests that this demonstrated uncertainty stems in part from
the fact that lawyers and social scientists have entirely different objectives, and consequently, employ
wholly differing conceptions of truth. Truth in science is simply not the same as the truth sought by legal
actors. It follows that expert testimony, the typical vehicle by which the law employs the social sciences,
is the ideal place to “observe the clash of legal and scientific conventions ….”36 When two creatures —
here, the legal and the social scientific endeavours — do not speak the same language, their ability to
communicate effectively will necessarily be limited.
The traditional idea that judges seek to uncover the truth is a romantic one that lies at the heart of the
adversarial system. Through testimony and cross-examination, it is said, the weaknesses in a party’s
arguments will come to light and the truth will ultimately shine through.37 Social scientists draw an
analogy with market theory, and have described an “Invisible Hand [that] guides the process toward the
maximum production of truth.”38 This idealization of the adversarial process is, of course, purely myth.
Critics write that rather than reveal it, the adversarial system, by means of its “rules and devices,” does
more to defeat the development of the truth, as jurists who claim to be seeking the truth are actually
involved in a game of self-deception.39 This dishonesty stems from the nature of the advocate’s role,
wherein the representation of the client’s interests prevails over the revelation of the truth at any cost.
Truth in the adversarial system, then, rather than the goal of litigation, becomes a “convenience, a
byproduct, or an accidental approximation.”40 Referring to the advocate, Justice Frankel wrote that
“[h]is is not the search for truth as such.”41 Rather, in many cases, “truth and victory are mutually
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Polygamy Reference, supra note 1 at para 50.
Choudhry, supra note 2 at 525.
Joseph Sanders, “Science, Law, and the Expert Witness” (2009) 72:1 Law & Contemp Probs 63 at 63.
Marvin E Frankel, “The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View” (1974) 123:5 U Pa L Rev 1031.
J Morgan Kousser, “Are Expert Witnesses Whores? Reflections on Objectivity in Scholarship and Expert Witnessing”
(1984) 6:1 The Public Historian 5 at 15.
Frankel, supra note 37 at 1034, 1036.
Ibid at 1037.
Ibid.
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incompatible.”42 This type of sentiment is common among social science scholars who have experienced
the trial process as expert witnesses.43 Thus, the gap between the legal result and our traditional
understanding of the truth is the product of a combination of factors, including the lawyer’s task of
achieving victory for the client. Unlike the truth-seeking goals of scholarship and science, advocacy is
concerned primarily with persuasion.44 The courtroom is less about truth-seeking, and more a place
where persuasion is central.45 Evidence, including that of social scientists, is not meant to uncover
scientific truths, but to persuade the judge of the correctness of one’s case.
On par with persuasion is the paramount role of procedure in the courtroom, even where it hinders
the production of truth.46 In legal proceedings, competing interests such as privacy, stability, speed and
cost are equal, if not more important, goals than truth-seeking.47 It is rare, in fact, that parties to court
proceedings will want their witnesses to “give the whole truth.”48 Instead, lawyers may employ
evidentiary tools and strategies designed to distort or block its revelation. The primacy of persuasion and
procedural norms is simply a part of the legal culture’s ethos. Truth, then, is but one of the priorities of
the adversarial system, and not a high-ranking one. But the inferior status of truth in law is weakened
even further when the legal system’s understanding of the truth is compared with that of the scientific
endeavour.
B. A Conflict of Values
The differing conceptions of truth among lawyers and social scientists are visible at the levels of
objectives, methodology and the overall values of the two systems. Deep tensions have been identified
between the objectives and values of the scientific enterprise and the legal culture.49 Among the sources
of friction is the idea that the inquisitive goal of the sciences — the essence of scientific inquiry — is
incompatible with the adversarial nature of adjudication. Whereas the aim of litigation is to resolve a
particular dispute through a sound evidentiary basis, the goal of scientific inquiry is to discover answers
and to produce knowledge.50 Scientific inquiry begins with a question and seeks evidence by which to
find the answer; advocacy begins with a position to be defended and gathers all of the evidence in its
42
43
44
45
46

47
48
49

50

Ibid.
See e.g. Kousser, supra note 38; David Rosner, “Trials and Tribulations: What Happens When Historians Enter the
Courtroom” (2009) 72:1 Law & Contemp Probs 137.
Anthony T Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1994) at vii.
Herbert M Kritzer, “The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law: Conflicting Norms in the Courtroom” (2009) 72:1 Law
& Contemp Probs 41 at 43.
See Richard O Lempert, “Built on Lies: Preliminary Reflections on Evidence Law as an Autopoietic System” (1998)
49:2 Hastings LJ 343 at 353.
Mirjan Damaška, “Truth in Adjudication” (1998) 49:2 Hastings LJ 289 at 301.
Ibid [emphasis in original].
Susan Haack, “Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law” (2009) 72:1 Law & Contemp
Probs 1 at 2 [Haack, “Irreconcilable Differences?”]. Although Professor Haack’s writings deal primarily with the natural
sciences and their role in private litigation, this research posits that her observations are readily applicable to the use of
social science evidence in constitutional adjudication.
Alexander Bird, “The Epistemology of Science—a Bird’s-Eye View” (2010) 175:1 Synthese 5.
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favour.51 At best, then, legal inquiry, where it aims to seek out evidence in favour of an advocate’s
position — what one author describes as “advocacy research” — is more “a kind of pseudo-inquiry”
than a quest for real answers.52
Further, the scientific search for answers fosters a sense of honesty with oneself and with colleagues,
which is often lacking among advocates making their case. This honesty about what the evidence
uncovers is typically accompanied by a willingness to share that evidence with colleagues in the field
and gives rise to the accepted scientific values of “disinterestedness” and “communism.”53 Advocacy, by
its nature, is far from disinterested. Legal concepts such as mandatory disclosure in criminal law and
discovery in civil matters — the very idea that communication between parties is so rigidly regulated
and often only the product of a statutory obligation — could hardly be compared to the sense of
community with which some characterize the scientific endeavour. And although this idealized view of
the scientific endeavour and its categorical distinction from the legal enterprise may, at times and in
practice, be difficult to maintain, the fact remains that the sciences and the legal system have very
different attitudes toward the gathering of evidence54 — a difference that becomes quite apparent once
the two undertakings enter the courtroom.
A reading of the Polygamy Reference brings out a further vital difference between science and law:
the legal preoccupation with the prompt resolution of disputes. Where scientists seek the “resolution” of
controversies, lawyers aim for the “termination” of legal disputes, which “occurs when nonepistemic
factors, such as an authoritative ruling by some official agency, brings to end a controversy.”55 By
contrast, the resolution of scientific questions is open-ended and is only reached once the interested
parties agree; the process can be a long one. Moreover, legal disputes on contentious social issues such
as polygamy tend to raise unsettled social science questions and questions that simply do not lend
themselves to clear answers. Whereas the law seeks finality, social facts about patterns of behaviour are
rarely immutable or static.56 Therefore, because the legal system values closure, it will often seek
answers to unsettled scientific questions,57 for the judiciary does not wish and cannot be expected to
wait for scientific agreement before resolving a dispute. Of course, this attitude directly conflicts with
the scientific tradition that closure only occurs once a consensus is formed, however long that may
take.58
While the legal system may content itself with reliance on evidence of unresolved theories, social
scientists well-versed in the adjudicative process are less keen to reduce the fruits of their research to
final answers that favour one party’s case. Experienced political science experts have expressed
51
52

53
54
55
56
57

58

Haack, “Irreconcilable Differences?”, supra note 49 at 13.
Susan Haack, “What’s Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science? An Essay in Legal Epistemology” (2008) 38:3 Seton Hall
L Rev 1053 at 1071[Haack, “Litigation-Driven Science”].
Haack, “Irreconcilable Differences?”, supra note 49 at 9.
Haack, “Litigation-Driven Science”, supra note 52.
Sanders, supra note 36 at 70.
See Donald L Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1977) at 274.
Haack, “Irreconcilable Differences?”, supra note 49 at 16. Accord Jonathan Yovel & Elizabeth Mertz, “The Role of
Social Science in Legal Decision” in Austin Sarat, ed, The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society (Malden: Blackwell
Publishing, 2004) 410.
Sanders, supra note 36 at 73.
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concerns over the use of their evidence in the courtroom, writing that the legal search for truth is not a
consensus-building exercise.59 For example, giving expert testimony is a very different experience from
presenting one’s research at a professional conference, where a colleague may provide constructive
criticism or complimentary feedback, the latter of which is not expected from opposing experts in the
courtroom.60 Even where scientific colleagues may express disagreement with the work of others,
disagreement tends to be centred on conclusions, or even research methods. Rarely is criticism aimed at
undermining a colleague’s credibility or professionalism, as is normally the case on the witness stand.
Likewise, historians lament the speed and finality of the trial, in contrast with the common practice of
scholars who may modify their perspective based on peer review and criticism from colleagues. The trial
has been described as “a one-shot affair, [where] one goes from expression to publication without
circulation, copy-editing, or galley proofs.”61 Because what is said during testimony immediately
becomes part of the evidentiary basis for the decision, the lengthy contemplation of one’s insights — a
routine part of scholarship — is necessarily reduced for an expert witness,62 at least where the subject of
expert testimony has not been researched prior to the litigation, as discussed below. It is easy to imagine
how this type of fast-tracking of the scientific process will not produce the same results that researchers
might arrive at in their natural habitats.63
Expert witnesses bemoan not only the adversarial method of presenting their evidence, but also the
ways that it is employed by advocates. In presenting the evidence of social scientists, lawyers are
perceived as valuing complexity and confusion over the clarity and precision which the witness’s work
is designed to bring.64 For example, the ways in which lawyers use historical evidence change the
historian’s role. In questioning expert witnesses and historians in particular, lawyers tend to hone in on
specific issues, framing questions narrowly, so as to elicit limited and focused responses. For one
historian, this type of questioning “undermines the historian’s autonomy and ability to cast a wide net, to
contextualize or to place events in a deeper historical context.”65 Instead, historians may be called to
testify as a tactic for obscuring and confusing the historical record.66 Litigation thus prevents historians
from actually doing history in the courtroom: “The essential attributes that we treasure most about
historical inquiry have to be left outside the door. The scope of analysis is narrowed, the imagination is
constrained, and the curiosity, curtailed.”67 Historical evidence, then, is often not used for
enlightenment. Rather, historians describe a practice of creating historical doubt and ignorance about the
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past.68 As my reading of the Polygamy Reference suggests, the distortion of social science research by
the legal system is not limited to the use of historical evidence. Rather, it is one of the natural
consequences of the divergent purposes and principles of different intellectual disciplines.69
The judiciary is, of course, conscious of the demonstrated gaps between the law and the sciences and
the limitations inherent in combining the two. In R. v. Marshall, Justice Binnie attempted to respond to
academic criticism about the way trial judges use evidence of indigenous history to justify their
decisions, acknowledging that “the law sees a finality of interpretation of historical events where
finality, according to the professional historian, is not possible.”70 Recognizing that the role of the courts
is to find the historical facts required for the resolution of a dispute, Justice Binnie explained that the
parties “cannot await the possibility of a stable academic consensus.”71 The decision does not, however,
explain why the discrepancies between science and law continue to be the subject of complacency
among legal actors. In light of the demonstrated disconnect between the legal and scientific endeavours,
this article suggests that the courts need a better way to employ the evidence of social scientists, for the
utility of the social sciences to the law can only be maximized once the gap between the two
undertakings is narrowed.
C. The Conflict in Practice
The Polygamy Reference was emblematic of the clash between the scientific and legal endeavours.
As mentioned, the evidence tendered represented the majority of contemporary academic research on the
subject. Dozens of experts were called by all of the parties, which included not only the Attorneys
General of Canada and British Columbia and the court-appointed amicus curiae, but also eleven
interveners. It was inevitable that Chief Justice Bauman would face a lack of consensus. And it was
improbable, at best, that the adversarial process would yield any sort of truth about the harms of
polygamy. Moreover, a portion of the principal research presented was conducted for the sole purpose of
testifying at trial. Dr. Joseph Henrich, for example, was the main witness called by the Attorney General
of British Columbia. A psychology professor, Dr. Henrich was qualified, for the purposes of the case,
“as an expert in psychology, particularly evolutionary psychology, in economics and in anthropology, as
well as in the interdisciplinary field of culture, cognition and co-evolution.”72 Although he had never
written about polygamy prior to studying the subject for the case, Chief Justice Bauman accepted his
report, which was the product of a four-month review of the existing social science literature on
polygamy.73
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Dr. Henrich’s evidence is precisely the kind of practice that scholars in legal epistemology condemn.
In her discussion of the complex relationship between the law and the sciences, Professor Haack writes
of “litigation-driven science,” or, “advocacy research.”74 As a product of the legal system and the
sciences combined, litigation-driven science lacks many of the qualities of traditional science. Having
been retained solely for the purpose of researching a specific and pointed question — the purported
harms of polygamy — Dr. Henrich’s research was necessarily limited. Based on their experiences as
expert witnesses, social scientists have written that this type of party-commissioned research is not
reflective of the scientific enterprise; the power to determine a scientific line of inquiry is the “critical
distinction” between research conducted for litigation and traditional scholarly research.75 In the
courtroom, the expert’s role is to answer only the questions he or she is asked. Expert knowledge, then,
becomes moulded or contrived to suit the narrow issue before the court, demonstrating the
argumentative nature of social science evidence once it enters the courtroom.76
Research prepared solely for the purposes of litigation is thus necessarily suspect, especially when
examined in light of the differences between the traditional scientific endeavour and the courtroom
process. In evaluating the admissibility of Dr. Henrich’s testimony, the judge acknowledged that his
research was prepared solely for trial. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Bauman wrote that Dr. Henrich’s
involvement met the scientific norm of disinterestedness, stating that the witness’s “research reflect[s],
not a pre-disposition to a particular result, but the positing of an hypothesis which [he] has tested in a
scientifically neutral manner.”77 Be that as it may, it is difficult to accept that the accelerated speed of
the trial process enabled Dr. Henrich to apply the same “unquestioned academic rigor” which, as a Tier
1 Canada Research Chair, he surely applies outside of the courtroom.78 His research on polygamy,
conducted over a brief four-month period, likely circumvented the normal process of re-questioning and
circulation, described above, leaving him little opportunity to modify his perspective. His evidence thus
risks having suffered from the natural truncation, which can result from the use of science in the
courtroom.79
Chief Justice Bauman accepted Dr. Henrich’s evidence that children in polygamous societies receive
less parental investment, the underlying theory being that married men would remain on the marriage
market and consequently invest their resources in acquiring more wives rather than in their own
children.80 That evidence was supported by 19th century census data from Mormon communities, as well
as contemporary studies of African societies.81 Without disputing the correctness of these findings, it is
worth asking whether further study, detached from the context of the litigation, carried out over a longer
period and subject to the type of requestioning that is typical of the scientific enterprise, might have
yielded more up-to-date data on the question. That concern is all the more pressing when considered in
light of Dr. Henrich’s acknowledgment that further research is needed in order to “confirm the link
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between reduced parental investment and child mortality.”82 Such reliance on unconfirmed or disputed
research findings is exactly what is referred to by the above-described distinction between closure in
science and law. In consequence, the trial process risks creating “spurious, artificial scientific
certainty.”83
Of course it is impossible to know whether Dr. Henrich’s research qualifies as litigation-driven
science in the weaker sense — where the need for the work in question simply arises out of litigation —
or in the stronger sense — where “work is undertaken for the purpose of finding evidence favoring one
side in litigation, and explaining away or otherwise playing down evidence favoring the other side.”84
But litigation-driven research in the weaker sense may also be suspect, as experts may harbour an
inappropriate desire to be helpful, which can affect their judgment.85 It is worth recalling that Dr.
Henrich was retained by the government to present evidence on the purported harms of polygamy.
As a counter to Dr. Henrich’s evidence, the amicus called on Dr. Todd Shackelford, “an expert in
evolutional psychology and in conflict between men and women in monogamous relationships.”86 In
response to Dr. Henrich’s correlations between polygamy and increased gender inequality, “as men seek
more control over women when women become scarce,”87 Dr. Shackelford presented evidence on the
negative consequences of “any kind of mating or marriage relationship, including monogamous ones.”88
That evidence highlighted the heightened rates of child neglect, abuse and filicide in situations “where
women with children fathered by a previous partner remarry, which is an arrangement overwhelmingly
associated with monogamy.”89 Relying on that evidence, which the Chief Justice found of little
assistance to his determination about the harms arising out of polygamous marriage, Dr. Henrich
extracted a number of observations about violence among unrelated family members and violence
driven in large part by male sexual jealousy. He concluded that “evolutionary theory and some empirical
evidence are consistent with the view that intra-familial violence … will be at least as bad, and probably
worse, in polygamous families and societies….”90 Faced with these propositions, Dr. Shackelford was
unwilling to accept his colleague’s extrapolations, based on his concerns that “neither expert had any
data regarding polygyny to support those extrapolations and that Dr. Henrich could not account for
possible cultural and contextual differences in polygynous relationships.”91 Dr. Henrich’s extrapolations,
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while “somewhat speculative and unproven,” where nevertheless accepted by the judge, who found
them to be “supported to some extent by other evidence in this reference.”92
It is uncontroversial to say that the law, as a general matter, does not seek the same kind of certainty
as the sciences. Proof on a balance of probabilities is a much lower standard than scientific proof. But it
is difficult to see how, when faced with two opposing experts, both of whom present credible and
compelling evidence, the judge is well-equipped to choose between competing narratives about a subject
that lies far beyond the expertise of the jurist. The judicial task of choosing between competing experts
illustrates the above-mentioned idea that the role of the advocate, by means of recruiting an expert is,
above all else, to persuade the court, sometimes based on reasoning outside of the expert’s disciplinary
sphere. Chief Justice Bauman, for example, appears to place significant weight on Dr. Henrich’s
prediction that the decriminalization of polygamy would result in a non-trivial increase in the practice,
which would then lead to a number of identified harms. For his part, however, Dr. Shackelford reasoned
that, while plausible, the spread of polygamy following decriminalization seemed “terribly, terribly
unlikely.”93
Whether the ultimate decision in the Polygamy Reference indeed rested on spurious and artificial
science, or rather, whether the results were sound and confirmed by further research, will remain
unknown to the legal community; the question has not been the subject of further proceedings. What is
significant about the decision, however, is its utility as a fitting illustration of some of the disciplinary
conflicts identified above between the law and the sciences. The decision illustrates that persuasion is
paramount in law, even where the research relied on to persuade may lack the typical attributes of the
scientific enterprise. Finally, given the clear disagreement between opposing experts, and as is often the
case in scientific and social fact-based disputes, the Polygamy Reference created settled law in spite of
obvious scientific disagreement and the continued existence of unresolved social questions.
IV. BLENDING THE LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL: PROBLEMS WITH ADJUDICATION
The breadth of issues tackled in the Polygamy Reference suggests that the current system of
adjudication does little to foster the effective communication between the law and non-legal disciplines
that is essential to the resolution of Charter disputes. The difficulty is due in large part to the fact that
the party-based form of adversarial litigation cannot readily accommodate the judicial interpretation of
the vast amounts of conflicting empirical data that normally accompany a rights-based constitutional
challenge. The incongruity of social science evidence and adversarial adjudication is particularly visible
when the issues in dispute are many, as is typical of Charter challenges. Moreover, the numerous issues
and the complexity of conflicting social science data often lead judges to defer to legislative choices,
thus threatening to undermine the very point in adjudicating Charter rights.
A. Adjudicating Polycentric Issues and Values
As was the case in the Polygamy Reference, Charter challenges rarely deal with isolated questions
capable of neat resolution in favour of a particular side. In examining the social science evidence that
often accompanies a claim of unconstitutionality, judges typically face varied and conflicting views and
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opinions on subjects which rarely admit of a correct answer. In the Polygamy Reference, Chief Justice
Bauman examined a number of controversial questions all related to the constitutionality of the
impugned provision. The conflicting nature of the evidence ultimately led the judge to defer to the
government’s choice. Without commenting on the substantive correctness of the decision, the case
suggests that where the issues in dispute are numerous and marked by division among expert witnesses,
the Anglo-American system is ill suited to resolving Charter challenges.
The Polygamy Reference was complex in the variety of issues it raised. Although only one statutory
provision was in question, the issues canvassed ranged widely, and included the historical evolution of
polygamy, polygamy as both a religious and secular practice, the effects of polygamy on young,
unmarried men, harms to women and children, rates of teen births in fundamentalist Mormon
communities and the potential effects of legal polygamy on Canadian society at large. All of these
questions necessitated the input of an expert in a distinct social science discipline. With so many issues
and perspectives in play, it is difficult to imagine how the adjudicative system and its “Invisible Hand”
could guide the court to the “maximum production of truth,”94 which would require, at minimum, that
there is one truth to be discovered, and not a multiplicity of varying and still-developing views.
The Polygamy Reference is typical of Charter challenges in that infringements of more than one
constitutional right were alleged. This “polycentricity” of Charter issues has led some jurists to express
doubt about the suitability of adversarial adjudication to constitutional challenges dealing with sensitive
social issues.95 Among the reasons cited for the “poor fit” is the fact that Charter adjudication hides the
need for the courts to make “value choices.”96 Whereas the adjudicative process and associated judicial
reasoning usually employ inductive logic — the application of a general principle to the facts of the case
— in Charter cases, judges must “select a major premise without there being a general principle to
govern their choice.”97 Thus, as a minority of the Supreme Court has acknowledged,98 value judgments
necessarily come into play in the adjudication of rights and freedoms, undermining the idea that any sort
of truth will be uncovered by the adversarial process.
B. Justiciability and Judicial Deference
The polycentric nature of Charter challenges and the inescapable value judgments they require of
judges has led to questions about whether these types of cases should be better regarded as nonjusticiable within the adversarial system of adjudication. The fact that “arguments do not decide
constitutional cases, human beings do …” has created some doubt as to their justiciability.99 Others have
likewise hinted toward the unsuitability of adjudication to Charter issues. In his discussion of the
institutional capacity of courts to adjudicate poverty claims under the Charter, Professor Wiseman
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suggests that the capacity of courts is generally challenged by a lack of certainty, caused in part by the
need to consider social science evidence, particularly when addressing arguments under section 1.100
The judicial capacity to properly adjudicate these issues is limited by the “lack of definitiveness of social
science evidence.”101 This deficiency is due to a lack of judicial experience and resources with which to
develop definitive answers and to the fact that, “in any event, such development may be impossible.”102
With respect to the judicial lack of resources, a proper treatment of the issue is beyond the scope of this
paper and much literature exists on the failings of legal education in this respect.103 On the other hand,
this article has already explored the near impossibility of developing the definitive answers which the
legal system seeks, given the above-described distinctions between the needs and goals of the respective
scientific and legal enterprises.
Related to these difficulties is the observation that the complexity of Charter interpretation requiring
reliance on social science evidence often results in undue deference to the legislator on the part of the
courts.104 Given that a threat to a Charter right will generally preclude a court from characterizing an
issue as non-justiciable,105 the need to adjudicate social science might instead incite a court to adopt a
more deferential approach to impugned legislation. In his review of Supreme Court jurisprudence
requiring the balancing of rights, Wiseman observes that courts prefer to defer to the legislature than
deem a claim non-justiciable.106 Adjudicating a challenge and ultimately deferring to Parliament serves
to acknowledge the constitutional interests at play and enables courts to evaluate whether an
infringement meets “minimum (deferential) standards of justiciability.”107 Thus, in the presence of
“interpretive doubt and institutional capacity and legitimacy concerns,” particularly when balancing
Charter rights, courts will often defer to legislative choice.108
Increased deference in the face of inconclusive empirical evidence could have been at play in the
Polygamy Reference and it is worth questioning whether the complexity of the social science evidence
tendered indeed induced Chief Justice Bauman to adopt a more deferential stance toward the
government’s choice. Surely, given the conflicting nature of the data tendered and the presence of 14
different parties to the dispute, the evidence would have created, at minimum, some uncertainty on the
part of the court. And, citing a number of Supreme Court decisions where deference was urged in the
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face of “complex social issues,”109 Chief Justice Bauman wrote that the government is entitled to a
degree of deference.110
In the Polygamy Reference, the harms of polygamy may well have been demonstrated according to
the appropriate standard of proof. Nevertheless, the decision should serve as a caution against undue
deference in the face of complex or controversial empirical evidence. A rush to defer to the
government’s choice in the presence of conflicting social science evidence would run contrary to Justice
McLachlin’s (as she then was) statement that,
[t]o carry judicial deference to the point of accepting Parliament's view simply on the
basis that the problem is serious and the solution difficult, would be to diminish the role
of the courts in the constitutional process and to weaken the structure of rights upon
which our constitution and our nation is founded.111
Courts, then, in order to avoid allegations of abdicating their constitutional duty in the presence of
complex empirical facts, should confront the evidence head on. Where the social sciences demonstrate
that legislation has unconstitutional effects, judges must not shy away from the appropriate conclusion,
political and value-laden as it may be. For it is up to the courts to determine whether the social science is
in fact inconclusive, or whether the government, in the context of a constitutional challenge to
legislation, has simply not met its burden of proof.112
This reading of the Polygamy Reference should suggest that deference in the balancing of
constitutional rights, “if taken too far or if applied without principle or coherence,”113 may undermine
the constitutional recognition of Charter rights. There is a real risk that undue deference will turn
judicial review into a “blunt instrument.”114 It follows that by inducing judges to defer to legislative
choices, the current adversarial method of adjudicating disputes, with its basic requirement that judges
pick a winning side, threatens to undermine the judicial role of safeguarding our constitutional rights and
freedoms. This is not to say that the types of contentious social issues that require the judicial evaluation
of complex empirical evidence have no place in the courtroom. Charter claims that challenge the
institutional capacity of the courts should not be lightly deemed non-justiciable, given the serious
consequences that would flow from such a decision.115 As the Supreme Court has stated on a number of
occasions, when Charter rights are engaged, the courts have a duty to evaluate constitutionality, even
where the evidence presents difficulties.116 Rather, Charter litigation should be used as a means for
managing the challenges to the Court’s institutional capacity,117 with courts approaching complex claims
109

110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Polygamy Reference, supra note 1 at para 1300, citing Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 at
para 53, [2009] 2 SCR 567. See also Polygamy Reference, supra note 1 at para 1221, citing R v Malmo-Levine; R v
Caine, 2003 SCC 74, [2003] 3 SCR 571.
Polygamy Reference, supra note 1 at para 1342.
RJR-MacDonald, supra note 3 at para 136, cited in Petersen, supra note 30 at 313.
Ibid.
Wiseman, supra note 100 at 458.
Petersen, supra note 30 at 311.
Wiseman, supra note 100 at 454.
See e.g. Operation Dismantle v The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 441.
Wiseman, supra note 100 at 454.

120

Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice

2015

according to the discrete issues raised and employing the contextual analysis made possible by the
detailed nature of the evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion suggests that the multidimensional and complex nature of the issues often
raised in Charter adjudication are not well served by an adversarial system in which evidence is
presented not to clarify a question, but in many cases, to confound the issues. This confusion, caused by
the adversarial system’s method of presenting large volumes of evidence aimed at persuading rather than
enlightening, will often leave courts with little choice but to defer to legislative, or political, choices, the
very things that courts are meant to keep in check. Of course, in order to effectively accomplish their
role, judges must be properly trained to evaluate the social science data presented to them and the
methodologies used to arrive at disputed empirical findings. Otherwise, courts and judges will continue
to be ill equipped to confront controversial empirical data and rule according to the evidence, and
deliberations about justice will necessarily be hindered.
The objective of this article is not to solve the problems it identifies. Rather, its purpose is to cast a
critical eye, through an in-depth reading of a concrete example, on the disconnect between the law and
the social sciences and to provide a practical demonstration of the drawbacks of using social science
evidence under the current model of Charter adjudication. With these observations in mind, it is hoped
that we are better able to appreciate the urgency of exploring potential avenues for reform, of which
there are many currently in use across common law jurisdictions.118 There is further work to be done on
how the legal system can properly train lawyers and judges to effectively draw on non-legal evidence,
just as there is room to study potential procedural reforms to the party-based system of adjudication. A
number of authors are exploring the use of less adversarial and more collaborative procedures for
dealing with sensitive and multi-faceted social phenomena.119 By highlighting the obstacles, this study
may help pave the way toward maximizing the cross-disciplinary sharing of information that will aid in
the effective delivery of justice by enabling the law to take full advantage of the invaluable resources
that the social sciences have to offer.
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